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This paper will deal in turn with the past, the present
and the future. My research on the past concerns, in
part, how Latin America got out of the mess the last
time around, in the 1930s and 1940s. My research on
the present deals with the secondary market for LDC
debt, in particular the information conveyed by the
market prices and its relevance for policy.
For the future, aside from these lessons, T shall discuss
the impact of recent events in Eastern Europe on the
prospects for Latin America. Here I have been
involved since September in chairing a group of
academic advisers to the European Commission on
the programme of aid for the restructuring of the
Hungarian and Polish economies.
Dealing with Debt in the 1930s
A few months ago, I completed a research project for
the World Bank, jointly with Barry Eichengreen of
Berkeley and CEPR, on dealing with debt in the 1930s
and 1980s. Perhaps some of our conclusions should
have influenced policy in the 1980s but were too late -
nevertheless, I think they are still relevant.
First, we found that countries which interrupted
service on their external debts in the 1930s recovered
more quickly from the Great Depression than did
countries that resisted default. It is of course difficult
to isolate how debt management strategy affects
subsequent macroeconomic performance. In the
1930s as in the 1980s, maintaining debt service was
often associated with fiscal austerity, import com-
pression, and export subsidies. Conversely, the
decision to suspend payments was often accompanied
by the currently unfashionable policies of fiscal
expansion, monetary reflation, and import-substituting
industrialisation.
This comprehensive reorientation of macroeconomic
stance makes it hard to distinguish the effects of
external debt management from the entire set of
policies. And we would certainly not recommend
that countries now considering debt service reduction
should couple it with irresponsible fiscal and
monetary policies or inward-looking trade strategies.
Nevertheless, history does suggest that default may be
good for you. If creditors are not going to grant
outright debt relief, despite the excellent advice they
get from middleweights like me and indeed Mr Brady
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(Mr Volcker is evidently a heavyweight), perhaps the
debtors will finally draw the necessary conclusions.
Such conclusions are reinforced by the evidence that
countries that defaulted in the 1930s did not suffer
inferior access to the capital markets after the war. The
important condition was to conclude negotiated
settlements with the creditors. Once they had done that,
countries which previously had suspended debt service
were treated by the capital market just as countries
that had maintained debt service without interruption.
Unlike experience since 1982, interwar default in some
cases led to a substantial reduction of transfers from
debtor to creditor. We might call this 'selective debt
relief'. It was in fact compatible with a reasonable
overall rate of return for creditors. The risk premium
they had charged ex ante was enough to give them
average realised rates of return in excess of yields on
British and US Treasury bonds.
Now, we observe that the banks have made very
substantial provisions for losses and nevertheless
survive. This suggests that ex post, they too might find
that their l970s lending to LDCs was not unprofitable,
even if there were major defaults tomorrow.
Our historical research shows that readjustment of
defaulted debts in the 1930s and l940s typically
involved long, complex negotiations. We often hear
the analogy with Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy
proceedings in the United States, under which default
and readjustment permit a clean break with the past.
This analogy is not more applicable to the 1930s than
to the 1980s and l990s. In many cases, interruptions to
debt service were sporadic, and uncertainty over
transfers lingered for decades. So in this regard,
looking to the 1930s for more effective procedures will
not help.
On the other hand, we did learn something potentially
useful about government behaviour. The standard
story of the 1930s is that creditor governments then
refrained from involvement in the crisis much more
than governments and the international financial
institutions do today. We found, however, that
creditor-country governments were often intimately
involved in interwar debt readjustment. The difference
is that in recent years creditor-country governments
and their agents have exerted continuous pressure on
the debtors to maintain debt service. In the 1930s and
1940s, by contrast, they pressured debtors and
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creditors alike.
History offers no encouragement to those who may
still believe that some comprehensive plan will sort out
the debt crisis in the 1980s. Global schemes to short-
circuit protracted bilateral negotiations proved
fruitless in the 1930s. Nearly every element of the
global plans advocated in the l980s was first suggested
and discussed in international meetings over 50 years
ago: a special international lending facility, matched
injections of private and public funds, conversion of
existing assets into new ones featuring different
contingencies. Ultimately none of the global schemes
could solve the issues of who should fund and control
their administration.
Finally, unlike global plans, market-based debt
reduction did make a useful contribution to resolving
the debt crisis of the l930s. Debt buybacks by the
debtors reduced the debt overhang and eliminated
marginal creditors. Secondary market prices were
influenced mainly by changes in the prospects for a
negotiated settlement. Buybacks did raise market
prices, but nowhere near enough to nullify their effects
in reducing the market value of outstanding debt.
Moreover, despite their public statements of dis-
approval, creditors were willing privately to welcome
buybacks out of reserves as a part of the readjustment
process.
The Secondary Market for Debt
These remarks on buybacks in the 1930s lead me
directly to the secondary market for LDC debt today
and its relevance for policy. Does the market offer a
sensible way out from under the burden of debt?
The fundamental question here is what the market
prices mean, what information they contain. It is clear
that the discounts in the secondary market represent
an inefficiency. Any discrepancy between the market
and the nominal value of the debt is in itself a source of
inefficiency.
My collaborator Daniel Cohen has put it this way: to
all investors in the world, except one, purchasing one
dollar of nominal claims on Chile costs (right now)
63 cents. The exception is Chile itself. When Chile
repays its debt it has to pay a full dollar for one dollar
of principal or one dollar of interest falling due. Basic
economics tells us that any price discrepancy like this
is inefficient and distorts incentives.
A second source of inefficiency arising from an
excessive nominal debt burden is reflected in the
secondary market price. This is the 'debt overhang'
illustrated by the so-called 'debt Laffer curve'. When
the nominal value of the debt is zero, the lenders
expect to receive nothing. When the debt approaches
infinity, they will expect to receive nothing too: either
the debtor will default or the domestic economy will
collapse totally and the return on the debt will be
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negligible.
So we can suppose there is a smooth curve relating the
total present value of expected repayments to the
nominal value of the debt: it starts at zero, first
increases with the nominal value to some maximum,
then starts to fall, ultimately to zero - just as the
Laffer curve is supposed to relate total tax revenue to
the tax rate.
The debt Laffer curve is in fact reflected in the
secondary market price, if the market prices debt
efficiently. For in that case, the price is just the present
value of expected repayments divided by the nominal
value outstanding. So it is the average value of a dollar
of nominal debt. If the elasticity of the market price
with respect to the face value of the debt exceeds unity,
then lenders will actually increase the market value of
their claims by writing off some of the debt. If the
elasticity is less than unity, then debtors can reduce the
market value of their debt through buybacks.
This is an empirical question of great practical
relevance. For example, buybacks such as those
endorsed by the Brady initiative have been called a
'boondoggle' for creditors. The argument is that they
will just transfer resources from the World Bank or the
IMF, or from debtor country reserves, to the banks
selling debt, without any effective reduction in the
aggregate market value of debt outstanding.
Other policy questions also revolve around what
information is conveyed by the secondary market
price and how it reacts to behaviour by the debtor and
creditors. For example, does the market price give an
appropriate benchmark for the price at which banks
should concede debt reduction? Or for the price at
which the debtor or an international agency should be
willing to purchase the debt? Is the price for a given
country's debt determined mainly by its own
economic performance, or is it dominated by overall
market conditions and contagion effects?
Work that I have been doing with Daniel Cohen
throws some light on these key issues. Our preliminary
results relate to monthly market price quotations for
the debt of 24 countries, from February 1986 to
November 1989. First, we find that the price of debt in
the secondary market does not behave like the price of
other assets, such as equity shares. In particular, the
returns to a holder of debt do not appear to be
significantly correlated to any measure of risk. One
inference is that the market does not price efficiently.
Second, the prices are very closely correlated -
indeed, with unit elasticity - to LIBOR. This suggests
that the market price does embody information about
the net present value of expected returns to holders of
the debt.
Third, the prices for a large debtor, such as Mexico,
are very significantly correlated to the weighted mean
of prices for other countries and not significantly
correlated to the price of its main export, petroleum.
This suggests there is an important systemic risk that is
poorly correlated to a country's wealth. On the other
hand, for smaller debtors such as Ecuador, the price of
oil is a major determinant of the secondary market
price.
This indicates a hierarchy of debtors. The large ones
determine systemic risks, while for the small debtors,
the market price depends on their wealth.
This last set of results illuminates the potential role of
buybacks in getting out from under the debt overhang.
To the extent that systemic risk is an important
determinant of the price, buybacks that reduce the
total nominal value will not significantly affect the
average value, that is, the market price. Equivalently,
the marginal price may be much closer to the average
price than critics of buybacks have maintained. The
case for buybacks by the debtors in the market is then
much stronger.
Latin America and Eastern Europe
But the future for highly indebted Latin American
countries will depend not only on what they can do for
themselves, whether in their debt strategies or in
changing the fundamentals that determine economic
performance. The East European revolutions of 1989
may have a major impact.
Debt is important because growth depends on
investment. Debt service depresses domestic invest-
ment and discourages foreign direct investment. The
tiansformation of Eastern Europe might weaken
industrial country efforts to reduce the debt burden on
Latin America, and it might also divert foreign direct
investment that would have come to Latin America.
Poland of course preceded Mexico in launching the
debt crisis with a moratorium just over nine years ago.
In writing about East European debt in 1977, I had
predicted this and also the danger for Hungary, which
then also had to seek assistance in early 1982.
Now these countries are among the most heavily
indebted in the world - $20 bn for Hungary's 10 mn
people, $40 bn against Poland's less than $8 bn of
convertible currency exports. By the end of 1989,
Poland's annual inflation rate had reached about
1000 per cent, a respectable level even by Latin
American standards. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany and Romania are not heavily indebted, but
as in Hungary and Poland, much oftheir capital stock
is hopelessly uneconomic.
Many billions of dollars will be needed for
reconstruction in Eastern Europe. Some will doubtless
come from domestic savings. But the demand for a net
inflow of resources is already strong and vocal. This
could come from grants, debt reduction for Hungary
and Poland, new lending, or foreign direct investment.
There will be some grant element in aid, and given the
budgetary constraints of which all industrial countries
are only too conscious, this must partly divert
resources from aid to Latin America.
The position on debt relief is by no means so clear.
Although Hungary has so far resisted rescheduling, at
great cost, the market discount is finally beginning to
open up. Hungary is likely to be a candidate for Brady
treatment after the elections of 24 March, and Poland
is already. The political pressure to grant them debt
relief may become overwhelming.
This could benefit Latin America. The banks'
emphasis on the case-by-case approach reflects
resistance to setting precedents; thus Mexico is
claimed to be unique. A few more, like Hungary and
Poland, could break down that barrier.
The Paris Club has ruled out debt reduction except for
the poorest countries. Here again, pressure to help
Poland might eventually bring the exception that
could become the rule.
This is the optimistic side. The negative aspect is that
Eastern Europe is drawing the attention and the
resources of the international lending agencies as well
as of private investors. Latin American countries may
well envy the amounts of official assistance already
promised or said to be likely. True, the banks are
unlikely to lend significantly, and even official sources
should hesitate to put substantial new money into
overindebted countries like Hungary and Poland. But
the World Bank will clearly lend heavily and also seek
co-financing with private investors.
Everyone is calling for foreign direct investment in
Eastern Europe, partly to reinforce the movement
towards capitalist market economies there. But FDI
to the LDCs from OECD countries has been running
at a rate less than $15 bn annually for the past few
years - only 10 per cent of total OECD FDI. So
Eastern Europe will be more competition for a rather
small pot, which it is unlikely to enlarge significantly.
Moreover, the East Europeans may increase the
pressure of 'tax competition' for FDI. Mexico now
claims to offer the best conditions for foreign private
investors in the world. East European countries may
try to match the tax breaks, and they will compete
favourably in regard to skilled labour at low real
wages.
They will also compete in goods markets with the
industrialising Latin American countries. Both in
patterns of actual and potential trade, and in what
they offer to FDI, the East European countries will
look to Western Europe, the US and Japan like
middle-income developing countries. Incidentally,
this is also likely to be uncomfortable for Southern
Europe - in particular the Southern tier of the
European Community. If Eastern Europe does turn
out to be the 'boom town', the 'gold rush' that some
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have called it, the Latin American countries will not be
the only ones to lose out.
Overall, the balance does not look favourable for
Latin America. The way forward is thus somewhat
more difficult. My own view is that progress will
require more aggressive action to achieve debt relief,
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including more active use of the secondary market.
But this must go hand in hand with more widespread,
determined efforts for domestic economic reforms, of
which Mexico is for the most part a good example.
After Brady, the initiativemust be taken by the Latin
American countries themselves.
